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Abstract
We develop an on-the-job search model in which immigrants search for jobs through
formal channels or networks, and the quality of job o¤ers di¤ers across search meth-
ods. The model predicts networks unambiguously lead to a larger share of network
jobs in job-to-job transitions, whereas the e¤ect is ambiguous in unemployment-to-job
transitions.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical literature has provided evidence on the e¤ect of social networks on im-
migrants labor market outcomes.1 However, the evidence is rather mixed. A source of
heterogeneity explaining these results is the size of the network: networks might have a
positive or negative e¤ect depending on their size and whether they are contemporaneous
Mailing address: Carretera México Toluca 3655, Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210, México, D.F. e-mail:
eva.arceo@cide.edu. Phone: +5255-5727-9800 #2759. Fax: +5255-5727-9878.
1For a survey of the literature refer to Ioannides and Loury (2004).
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with the immigrant or they preceded the immigrants arrival.2 The theoretical literature
also o¤ers a wide range of explanations on the source and sign of the networks e¤ects on
labor market outcomes.3
In this paper, we examine a di¤erent source of heterogeneity that stems from relaxing
two assumptions used in previous literature on the e¤ect of networks on job search; namely
that there is only unemployment search (Beaman, 2012; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005;
Montgomery, 1992; Patel and Vella, 2007) and that the wage o¤ers from di¤erent search
methods are drawn from the same wage distribution (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004;
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Patel and Vella, 2007). In our model, we allow for on-
the-job search, a direct impact of network size on the arrival rate of wage o¤ers, and two
exogenous wage o¤er distributions for each search method. Relaxing those assumptions will
lead to important implications on starting wages, wage growth and occupational choices
dependent on the network size and the value of on-the-job search relative to unemployment
search, thus reconciling the mixed empirical evidence on the e¤ect of network size. The
most important nding is that the share of jobs found through the network increases as
the network size increases only in the case of job-to-job transitions, whereas the e¤ect is
ambiguous for unemployment-to-job transitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop an on-the-job
search model for low-skilled immigrants. Section 3 presents some comparative statics on
labor market outcomes. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This section develops an on-the-job search model4 in which individuals use two job search
methods simultaneously: their network and other formal channels. Our contribution to the
2See for instance: Beaman (2012), Munshi (2003), and Wahba and Zenou (2005).
3See for example Montgomery (1991 and 1992); Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994); and Koning, van der
Berg and Ridder (1997).
4Mortensen (1987); and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) present a survey of the literature on job
search.
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literature is that we allow for exogenous di¤erences in the distribution of wage o¤ers of the
two search methods and the arrival rate of job o¤ers from the network depends on the network
size. Previous work had only allowed for di¤erences in the distributions of wage o¤ers or for
the dependence of the arrival rate on the network size, but not both. There are two only
exceptions in the literature. The rst exception is Calvó-Armengol and Jacksons (2004)
model of information transmission in networks. However their model implicitly assumes that
unemployed individuals search for jobs using formal and informal channels, but employed
individuals search only through the formal channels. Our model relaxes this assumption by
allowing unemployed and employed workers to search using formal and informal methods.
The other exception is Goel and Langs (2009) model. However their model is a static one
and does not allow us to di¤erentiate between unemployment search and on-the-job search.
Assume we have a utility maximizing individual who is searching for a job. As it is
standard, individuals do not posses perfect information about the available vacancies. Thus
they invest time searching for a job using two methods: (1) the informal methods, which
include obtaining information from the individuals network; and (2) formal methods, such
as contacting or visiting employers directly, posting advertisements, and so on. Let n index
the informal methods (i.e. the network), and f the formal methods. If the individual uses
the network, she will receive a wage o¤er at rate en (N) if she is employed, and 
u
n (N) if she
is unemployed, where N is the network size. For simplicity, assume that
en (N) = 
e
n (N) , and 
u
n (N) = 
u
n (N) ; (1)
with  (0) = 0; 0 > 0;
such that as the network size increases, the arrival of wage o¤ers increases because there
may be more information on available jobs. In the case of formal search methods, the arrival
rates are going to be given by ef , and 
u
f ; for the employed and unemployed, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that ef = 
u
f :
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Wage o¤ers are an i:i:d: draw from a cumulative distribution function Fn (wn) ; where
wn is the wage of a "network job". Each wage o¤er from the formal channel is an i:i:d:
draw from a distribution function Ff (wf ) ; where wf is the wage of a "formal-channel job".
Assume that the support of the distribution functions is upperly bounded by w <1: So w
is the minimum wage such that Fj ( w) = 1 for j = n; f:
Wage o¤ers are an i:i:d: draw from a cumulative distribution function Fn (wn) ; where
wn is the wage of a "network job". Each wage o¤er from the formal channel is an i:i:d:
draw from a distribution function Ff (wf ) ; where wf is the wage of a "formal-channel job".
Assume that the support of the distribution functions is upperly bounded by w <1: So w
is the minimum wage such that Fj ( w) = 1 for j = n; f:
We will assume that the formal channels distribution of wage o¤ers is superior to the
low-skilled immigrants network wage o¤er distribution. For instance, network jobs may o¤er
lower wages if working with fellow countrymen is regarded as a job amenity. In particular,
we will assume that Ff (wf ) is larger than Fn (wn) in the hazard rate order sense, which
formally means that:
dFn (w)
Fn (w)
 dFf (w)Ff (w) for all w  0;
where Fj (w) = 1 Fj (w), j = n; o: The intuition behind this condition would be as follows.
Assuming that the arrival rates are the same for network and for formal-channel jobs, and
given a wage o¤er wo in the common support of Ff (w) and Fn (w) ; the probability that
an immigrant will nd a job in the network in an innitesimal interval to the right of wo
is higher than the probability of nding a job through formal search methods. The hazard
rate order is stronger than, and in fact implies, rst-order stochastic dominance.
In each labor status the individuals income is equal to:
y =
8><>: w
 if employed
z if unemployed
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where w is the wage net of search costs when employed, w = w   ce; with ce being the
costs of search while employed; and z is the net income in unemployment, z = b   cu; b
denotes the gross income from unemployment, and cu are the search costs when unemployed
assumed constant across job search methods in this model. Finally, all types of jobs end at
an exogenous rate q.
The individuals objective is to maximize his lifetime wealth. The Bellman equations of
this search problem are:
rV u = z + un (N)
Z w
wr
[V e (wn)  V u] dFn (wn) + uf
Z w
wr
[V e (wf )  V u] dFf (wf ) (2)
rV e (w) = w + q [V u   V e (w)] + en (N)
Z w
w
[V e (wn)  V e (w)] dFn (wn) (3)
+ef
Z w
w
[V e (wf )  V e (w)] dFf (wf ) ;
where V u is the present discounted value of unemployment, V e is the employment counter-
part, and wr is the reservation wage.
The solution to the maximization problem denes the optimal strategy to transit from
unemployment to employment, and from job to job. In the latter case, we know that individ-
uals will move to a new job if the wage o¤er is higher than the current wage. The transitions
from unemployment to employment are governed by the reservation wage, which is dened
as the wage that leaves the immigrant indi¤erent between work and unemployment. Hence
in our context, the reservation wage solves for:
V e (wr) = V u (4)
Solving for the reservation wage, and taking into account that we are assuming uf = 
e
f ; we
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get the following expression:
wr = b+ (ce   cu) + [un (N)  en (N)]
Z w
wr
Fn (w) dw
r + q + en (N)
Fn (w) + 
e
f
Ff (w)
(5)
Hence the reservation wage is equal to the gross income from unemployment plus the dif-
ference in employment and unemployment search costs plus the net value of unemployment
search relative to on-the-job search.
3 Implications of the Model: Comparative Statics
One of our objectives in this paper was to establish another source for the heterogeneity in
the e¤ect of the network. The following claim establishes that the e¤ect of the networks size
on the reservation wages, and hence in the expectation of the observed wages, is ambiguous.
The network e¤ect will depend on whether unemployment search is relatively more valuable
than on-the-job search or not.
Claim 1 The e¤ect of the network size on the reservation wage is ambiguous. We have the
following three cases: (1) if there is no on-the-job search, as it has been assumed in part of
the literature or en (N) < 
u
n (N), then
@wr
@N
> 0; (2) if en (N) > 
u
n (N) ; then
@wr
@N
< 0; and
nally, (3) if en (N) = 
u
n (N) ; then
@wr
@N
= 0:
Proof. Let 
 
wr; N; uf ; 
e
f ; r; q

be given by:

 
wr; N; uf ; 
e
f ; r; q

= wr   z   ce   [un (N)  en (N)]
Z w
wr
Fn (w)
 (w)
dw = 0
where  (w) = r + q + en (N) Fn (w) + 
e
f
Ff (w) : Then using the implicit function theorem
we have that @w
r
@N
=   N
wr
: Thus di¤erentiating  () with respect to wr, we get:
wr = 1  [en (N)  un (N)]
Fn (w
r)
 (wr)
> 0
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Di¤erentiating  () with respect to N we get:
N = (
e0
n   u0n )
Z w
wr
Fn (w)
 (w)
dw   e0n (en   un)
Z w
wr
Fn (w)
2
 (w)2
dw
=
Z w
wr
0 (en   un) Fn (w)  (w)  0 (en   un)en Fn (w)2
 (w)2
dw
= (en   un)
Z w
wr
0 Fn (w)
 
r + q + ef
Ff (w)

 (w)2
dw T 0
where 0 = d(N)
dN
; and I have omitted the arguments of in (N) ;and 
i0
n (N), i = e; u, for
notational simplicity. The integral in the last expression is always positive. Hence the sign
of N depends on the sign of (
e
n   un) ; which is also the sign of en (N)   un (N) : So we
have that:
@wr
@N
=  
(en   un)
R w
wr
0 Fn(w)(r+q+ef Ff (w))
(w)2
1  [en (N)  un (N)]
Fn(wr)
(wr)
Q 0:
The sign of @w
r
@N
is ambiguous, @w
r
@N
Q 0, and it will depend on whether en (N) R un (N) :
Hence, the e¤ect of the network size on the reservation wage is ultimately an empirical
question. The results on the reservation wage are easily extended to the observed wage, given
that the observed distribution of wages is truncated at the lower tail of the distribution by
the reservation wage. Hence, a higher reservation wage implies that the mean of the observed
wages is also higher.
Our next two results explore the relationship between the concentration on network jobs
and the network size.
Claim 2 The probability of job-to-job transitions increases with the network size, and a
larger share of these transitions are due to the network.
Proof. Let e be the proportion of job-to-job transitions due to the network, which is given
by:
e =
en (N)
Fn (w)
en (N)
Fn (w) + 
e
f
Ff (w)
;
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where w is the current wage. The numerator is the probability that an employed individual
accepts a network o¤er, and the denominator is the probability that the individual will
change jobs. Di¤erentiating e with respect to N , we get:
@e
@N
=
e0n
e
f
Fn (w) Ff (w)
en Fn (w) + 
e
f
Ff (w)
2 > 0:
Hence as the network size increases more of the job-to-job transitions are going to be due to
wage o¤ers coming from the network.
Claim 3 The probability of unemployment-to-job transitions increases with the network size,
and a larger share of these transitions is due to the network if @w
r
@N
< 0 and Ff (wf ) is larger
than Fn (wn) in the hazard rate order sense.
Proof. Let u be the fraction of transitions from unemployment to employment due to the
network, which is given by:
u =
un (N) Fn (w
r)
un (N) Fn (w
r) + uf Ff (w
r)
;
where the numerator is the probability that an unemployed migrant nds a job through
the network, and the denominator is the probability that he nds a job using either search
method. Di¤erentiating u with respect to N , we get:
@u
@N
=
uf
u0
n
Fn (w
r) Ff (w
r) + uf
u
n
@wr
@N

Fn (w
r) dFf (w
r)  Ff (wr) dFn (wr)

un Fn (w) + 
u
f
Ff (w)
2
In order to determine the sign of @
u
@N
, we need to nd the sign of the numerator in the expres-
sion above. Dividing the numerator by uf Fn (w
r) Ff (w
r) ;we get the following expression:
u0n + 
u
n
@wr
@N

dFf (w
r)
Ff (wr)
  dFn (w
r)
Fn (wr)

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The expression above will be strictly positive if Ff (w) is larger than Fn (w) in the hazard
rate order sense, and hence we will have that:
@u
@N
=
uf
u0
n
Fn (w
r) Ff (w
r) + uf
u
n
@wr
@N

Fn (w
r) dFf (w
r)  Ff (wr) dFn (wr)

un Fn (w) + 
u
f
Ff (w)
2 > 0
Thus unemployed individuals will tend to concentrate on network jobs as the network size
increases.
Hence, the model predicts that the e¤ect of the network size is unambiguous for job-
to-job transitions: there is going to be more clustering in network jobs as the network size
increases. However, the result only holds under certain conditions for unemployment-to-
job transitions, where in addition to the superiority of formal jobs, we also need that the
reservation wage is a decreasing function of the network size, or that the arrival rate from
network jobs is higher when employed than when unemployed (following Claim 1). In the
case of low-skilled immigrants, especially those who recently arrived, it seems sensible to
assume that the job o¤er arrival rate from networks when employed is higher than the
o¤er arrival rate from networks when unemployed. The intuition behind this assumption
is that when immigrants start working both their knowledge on the host countrys labor
market and their network expand, so that overall, they receive more valuable information
per connection than an unemployed worker. Hence, in the case of low-skilled workers, our
model reaches a result consistent with one of the ndings in Patel and Vella (2007). They nd
that recent immigrants locate in the same occupations as their countrymen within regional
labor markets, which is consistent with Claim 3. Their other nding states that recent
immigrants enjoy higher wages in common network jobs. We would only be able to explain
concurrent higher wages and occupational clustering if en (N) < 
u
n (N) (Claim 1), and if
the occupational clustering is a result of job-to-job transitions (Claim 2).
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4 Conclusions
This paper developed an on-the-job search model in which individuals are allowed to search
for a job using formal and informal methods simultaneously. The model allows for the network
size to have a direct e¤ect on the arrival rate of job o¤ers both while employed and while
unemployed; and that the distribution of wage o¤ers from the network is di¤erent than
the distribution of o¤ers from formal channels. We nd that the e¤ect of the network size
on the reservation wages, and hence on observed wages, is ambiguous. The heterogeneity
of the e¤ect arises from the di¤erence in the employment-o¤er arrival rate relative to the
unemployment-o¤er arrival rate. Our model is consistent with previous literature in the sense
that when there is no on-the-job search (Beaman, 2012; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005)
or when the unemployment-o¤er arrival rate is higher than the employment-o¤er arrival
rate (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004), the reservation wage increases when the network
is larger. We also nd that the proportion of job-to-job transitions due to the network is
increasing on the network size. In contrast, the relationship between the network size and
the proportion of unemployment-to-employment transitions requires some rather restrictive
assumptions for it to be positive.
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